This study finds that a unilateral reduction in Brazil's relatively high barriers to trade would increase its integration into the world economy and expand production and jobs. Using a multi-region Computable General Equilibrium model that is particularly wellsuited to gauge the impact of trade policy shocks in global value chains, this study documents the effects of reducing important barriers to trade in Brazil: reducing import tariffs and local content requirements, and eliminating indirect taxes levied on exports. The largest gains in production and exports would accrue to manufacturing sectors, contradicting the widespread perception in Brazil that lifting trade protection would reduce the share of manufacturing in production. Moreover, deeper integration into global value chains would raise economic efficiency, and the higher share of foreign intermediate goods used in production would lead to lower prices, boost international Trade Restrictions in Brazil : Who Pays the Price?
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II provides an overview of trade and tax policies that hamper the openness of the Brazilian economy and whose impact on the economy we simulate. Section III describes the policy change simulations and presents the model used in this study. Section IV discusses the effects of trade liberalisation on the economy. Section V tests the importance of macroeconomic assumptions and elasticity values on the results, and section VI concludes the paper with a final discussion of the outcomes.
II. Brazilian Trade Policy
Like in many other developing countries, international trade protection in Brazil has been employed traditionally as part of a strategy to promote industrial development. By restricting competition in the domestic market, policymakers sought to reduce 287 the country's dependency on commodity exports, diversify production, and promote technological upgrades (Thorstensen and Ferraz 2015) . A reform in 1991 put an end to a long period of important constraints, bringing down the modal tariff from 40% to 20% and the mean tariff from 42% in 1988 to 12% in 1994. This tariff reform programme was accompanied by additional measures that greatly reduced the level of protectionism and opened up the Brazilian economy: Anexo C, a list of 1,300 products that in practice were not allowed to be imported, was eliminated alongside a majority of Special Regimes (Hay 1997) .
Since 1994, import tariffs in most sectors have averaged around 10% to 20%, after having fallen from very high levels in some sectors, for instance, from 90% to 20% in wearing apparel and from 48% to 14% in machinery and equipment. However, products with higher technological content (software and fine chemicals), longer production chains (automobiles), or low competitiveness relative to products from Asian economies (consumer electronics) are subject to higher tariff rates of between 30% to 35%. Subsequently, there have been several small occasional amendments, including tariff hikes for many products included in the Mercosur list of exceptions (capital goods, computing, and telecommunications) in 1995, a generalised increase of 3% in 1997, and a temporary tariff increase for 100 products in 2012 (Hay 1997 , Castilho et al. 2015 . As of 2004, two indirect taxes began to be levied on imports, whereas before they were only levied on domestic production (Baumann and Kume 2013) . 2 Today's tariff profile is not much different from the one resulting from the tariff reform programme of 1991 and Mercosur negotiations. Overall, despite substantial trade liberalisation in the 1990s, traces of the Brazil import-substitution industrialisation strategy still remain.
Among BRICS countries, Brazil applies the highest mean import tariff on nonagricultural products and the second highest overall (Thorstensen and Ferraz 2015) . In 2014, the mean non-weighted tariff was 11.7% and the maximum was 55%, albeit applied to only two products. The second highest tariff rate is 35%, applied to about 500 products across several sectors, predominantly in textiles and automotive vehicles. The modal tariff was 14% and the median 12% (Castilho et al. 2015) . At the sector level, Brazil applies tariffs above 10% in textiles, wearing apparel, leather, wood products, ferrous metals, motor vehicles, machinery and equipment, and other manufacturing (weighted averages). Other manufacturing sectors have tariffs between 5% and 10%. There are no or small import tariffs below 2% applied to coal, oil, gas, minerals, and jei Vol.32 No.2, June 2017, 283~323 Sónia Araújo and Dorothee Flaig http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/jei.2017.32.2.283 288 petrochemical products. As regards bilateral trade policy, Brazil has adopted a strategy of regional integration, and it has lowered trade barriers against other Latin American economies through preferential agreements offering tariff reductions, while maintaining higher protection against other regions. Brazil is also imposing LCRs on an increasing number of products (Mattos 2013) . LCRs are demands made to a firm or sector to purchase domestically a given share of inputs or goods and services for investment purposes. LCRs fall under the larger category of so-called "localisation barriers" to trade that favour domestic industry at the expense of foreign competitors. LCR measures are put in place largely with a view to support industrial and technological development and the associated employment gains they purportedly bring (OECD 2014) . Studies assessing the impact of LCRs have generally concluded that although these policies may achieve some of their short-run objectives, they undermine industrial competitiveness over the long run (Hufbauer 2013 ). An OECD study finds that Brazil is second only to Indonesia in the number of LCRs imposed since the onset of the global crisis in 2008 (OECD 2014) . The study documents 17 LCRs in force in Brazil: nine concerning input measures, six involving government procurement, and two imposing ownership/local partnership obligations. We simulate the effects of lifting LCRs restricting market access and LCRs involving price preference measures but do not include LCRs on government procurement, as they are not so readily modelled in METRO, the OECD CGE Trade Model used in our study.
In contrast to the generalised international practice on indirect taxation, Brazilian exports are not zero taxed. In spite of a Constitutional amendment (No. 42/2003) exempting exports from indirect taxes, in practice, administrative hurdles and limiting instruments, including those provided for in the Lei Kandir and in individual state legislation, prevent exporters from recovering indirect taxes levied along the production chain (de Siqueira et al. 2010, Vieira and Mourão 2015) . Although indirect taxes are not listed among trade impediments, their sheer size and the difficulty of Brazilian entrepreneurs in obtaining a zero rating for exports puts them at a competitive disadvantage with foreign competitors in international markets, constituting a de facto barrier to trade.
Indirect taxes tend to be lower on agricultural and food products compared with manufactured goods, which involve longer production chains and tend to accumulate more indirect taxes relative to products with little or no transformation. Different (ICMS) 3 tax rates applied to different products and cumulative taxation lead to severe distortion of relative prices that in turn causes important resource misallocation, with resources shifting away from manufacturing into raw materials and agribusiness (OECD 2015a). In addition, this incentivises businesses to vertically integrate production stages into a single firm, which is likely to bring inefficiencies and is in contrast with today's organisation of production in value-chains (Mendes 2014) . Finally, it directs final consumption towards relatively cheaper imported goods, which are not subject to cumulative taxation in their country of origin.
Protection of the domestic market through import tariffs and LCRs reduces the incentives to raise efficiency and invest in innovation to increase quality or product differentiation. In addition, it prevents domestic producers from sourcing from the lowest-cost or high-quality input suppliers. Failing to zero-tax exports increases producer prices, setting Brazilian exports at a competitive disadvantage relative to international competitors. Today, Brazil's GDP represents more than 3% of the world economy, but its export market share is around 1.2%, a figure that has remained almost unchanged in the past two decades (Figure 2) . Despite the high level of protection, the industry share in total value-added has been unchanged in the past 20 years, and Brazil's industrial sector is actually small for a middle-income economy (Figure 3) . Moreover, the share of manufacturing in total value-added has actually declined in the past 10 years, while labour productivity in manufacturing has stayed constant at very low levels (Figure 4, OECD 2015a 
III. Simulation

A. Policy scenarios
The simulations intend to evaluate the economic impact of lifting or reducing trade policies that hinder the integration of the Brazilian economy in the world economy: import tariffs, LCRs, and taxes levied on exports, which, in the Brazilian case, stem mostly from non-zero-rating of exports in indirect taxes. As LCRs that are part of this 
B. The METRO model
This study makes use of the OECD Trade Model, METRO, 6 which derives from the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) based CGE model GLOBE developed by McDonald and Thierfelder (2013) . METRO is a multi-region CGE model that captures interindustry effects while tracking differences in trade patterns by individual country and sector.
The general equilibrium setup of CGE models, including the whole economy, makes it possible to detect spill-over effects and allow for the analysis of effects on various economic variables such as trade, production, or final demand. Therefore, CGE models are typically used to evaluate policy shocks whose impacts are expected to be complex, are transmitted by different channels, have economy-wide effects, and materialise not only in one but various rounds (e.g., trade and fiscal policy reform). They are especially useful to answer "what-if" type of questions. By nature, CGE models also include numerous parameters, that is, elasticities, which are often criticised. To account for these criticisms and evaluate the effects of various assumptions on the results, the study contains a section on sensitivity analysis.
Similar to any CGE model, METRO requires a complete specification of all economic activities and explicit recognition of inter-sector linkages. This approach is therefore ideal for examining the impact of a change in policy on the whole economy. 295 the Agriculture and Food sectors, and trading partners are allocated to seven regions (Appendix 1). In addition, the model uses a vector of trade and production elasticities, which are based on GTAP elasticities. For the purpose of this study, the chosen trade elasticities are double the standard GTAP values; the reasons for this choice and a thorough sensitivity analysis are included in the section V.
Like GLOBE, the underlying approach in the METRO multi-region model is the construction of a series of single-country CGE models that are linked through trade relationships. As is common in CGE models, the price system is linear homogeneous, which implies that simulations provide relative, not absolute, price changes. Each region has its own numéraire, typically the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and an exchange rate (an exchange rate index of reference regions serves as model numéraire). Thus, price effects inside a country are fed through the model as a change relative to the country's numéraire, and prices between regions change relative to the reference region. Imports compete with domestic goods, and producers' decisions to export are based on relative price differentials between domestic and foreign markets.
On the production side, the model assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Production activities maximise profits and form output from primary inputs (i.e., land, natural resources, labour, and capital), combined using the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) technology, and intermediate inputs in fixed shares (Leontief technology). Households are assumed to maximise utility subject to the Stone-Geary utility function, which allows for the inclusion of a subsistence level of consumption. All commodity and activity taxes are expressed as ad valorem tax rates, and taxes are the only income source to the government. Government consumption is in fixed proportion to its income, and government savings are defined as residual. Closure rules for the government account allow for various fiscal specifications.
7 Total savings consist of savings from households, the internal balance on the government account, and the external balance on the trade account. The external balance is defined as the difference between total exports and total imports in domestic currency units. While income to the capital account is defined by several savings sources, expenditures by the capital account are based solely on commodity demand for investment. 
C. Underlying economic conditions
CGE models resemble a closed system of economic flows, and markets must be balanced. The so-called closure rules specify how markets balance. METRO allows for several general closure rules that relate to macroeconomic considerations (e.g., if investment is savings driven or exogenous) and specific closure rules that capture particular features of an economic system (e.g., the degree of intersectoral capital mobility).
The medium-long term standard closure is specified as the following:
• Following the standard norm, in the foreign exchange market, the current account balance is fixed in the standard closure, and the exchange rate is floating. This assumption avoids the giving or bouncing of welfare effects to the rest of the world. In a comparative static model, the country otherwise would have the possibility to indefinitely run a balance of trade deficit without having to pay it back. The model is governed by relative price changes, and the exchange rate index for the reference region (North America) serves as the world numéraire and the region-specific consumer price index serves as the regional numéraire.
• In the capital market, the model setup follows the Keynesian approach with investment-driven savings, so that the value of investment remains as a fixed share of final demand, and the savings rate adjusts.
• Governments are assumed to maintain a constant spending relative to final demand, and the tax rates adjust to maintain the balance. In this exercise, income tax revenues adjust to maintain the balance.
• In factor markets, capital, land, and natural resources are fully employed and mobile across sectors. Labour is assumed mobile across sectors, and there is unemployment. The sensitivity of results to these underlying assumptions about the behaviour of the economy is tested by re-running the policy simulations and allowing each of the following macroeconomic conditions to change at a time: 
IV. Effects of the Brazilian Trade Policy
All policy measures towards liberalising trade would raise aggregate exports, production, employment, investment, and households' income and consumption (Table  1 and Table 2 ). The largest gains on production accrue from ending indirect taxation of exports. Total exports would be about 19% higher in the absence of all trade barriers, including LCRs and input taxes on exports. The largest contribution to export growth stems from the lower tariffs on intermediate goods used in production of goods and services in Brazil, signalling a gain in competitiveness due to cheaper imported inputs. 8 The total effects on exports are larger than increases in exports for intermediate use and household consumption, which account for 70% and 18% of exports, respectively, due to an increase in capital goods exports, which account for an additional 10% of total export growth.
A. International trade
The boost in exports of intermediate goods and services (Table 1 , third row) and exports for final consumption (Table 1 , fourth row) are approximately of the same magnitude when import protection is reduced (i.e., a cut in tariffs and LCRs), while zero-taxing exports would mainly have an impact on raising exports of intermediate goods and services. This result is driven by the current structure of Brazilian trade and hence by the static nature of the model. More than half of final consumption exports are comprised of agriculture and food products, which benefit from no or very low ICMS tax rate, the largest indirect tax. Instead, nearly 70% of exports of intermediate goods are manufactured goods, characterised by longer production chains, hence tending to accumulate more indirect taxes along the production process.
The rise in exports is greater than the rise in imports in all policy scenarios. Tariff cuts and the removal of LCRs lead to an increase in imports as a direct effect, but second-round effects mitigate this inflow: the reduction of import barriers to trade decreases input prices for domestic producers, lowering production costs and increasing competitiveness. However, the clear net effect is not robust to changes in the model elasticities.
B. Effects on production
A liberalisation of Brazil's trade increases overall production. The largest effect in terms of individual policies comes from zero-taxing exports, but the reduction of tariff on intermediate goods and LCRs has an important positive effect on production as well. When all trade restrictions considered in this exercise are removed, production increases by 1.7% (Table 1) .
The protection of the domestic market often comes from the belief that increased openness destroys jobs and increases low Value Added (VA) exports while importing 299 high VA products. Brazil's current export structure is strongly concentrated: five sectors account for more than 50% of total exports, and agricultural, mining, and gas exports alone account for 35% ( Figure 5A ). Our results reveal that full trade liberalisation increases exports in all sectors except oil and gas, with the strongest gains occurring in manufacturing, shifting export concentration away from primary products (Figure 7 and Appendix 3). Moreover, the largest export increases include high value-added sectors wherein production is undertaken in global production chains (increases between 35% and 62%): these include leather products, electronic equipment, transport equipment, motor vehicles, ferrous and other metals, and machinery and equipment sectors. Consequently, the share of primary goods exports in total exports decreases by six percentage points to 32%. Exports even increase to all regional partners. Similar to exports, imports are strongly concentrated in a few sectors: chemicals, rubber, plastic products, and machinery and equipment alone account for 33% of the total imports ( Figure 5B ). Import liberalisation has two opposite effects on production: On one hand, firms benefit from access to cheaper inputs. This effect is most prominent in metal products, transport equipment, and leather products, where production is increased in simulations that only consider import liberalisation (Appendix 2). On the other hand, firms face increasing competition in final demand and intermediates, and, indeed, production decreases in textiles, chemical, rubber, plastic products, and machinery and equipment. The negative effect seems only partly related to the import share or level of initial protection, depending as well on whether production can benefit from decreasing production costs. For example, while non-ferrous metals are strongly imported (import share of 37%) and wood products are strongly protected with average tariff levels around 15%, both sectors benefit from import liberalisation and increase production (Appendix 2).
All sectors benefit from the full liberalisation of trade, and the effect is strongest in 301 manufacturing production with a 2.5% increase (Figure 6 ). Primary sectors benefit more from import liberalisation, and manufacturing sectors benefit more from the liberalisation of the export side. Total production is slightly negatively affected when all import tariffs and LCRs are eliminated. However, when exports are exempted from indirect taxes, manufacturing experiences an additional positive boost from tariff reduction (Figure 6 ). Services benefit from reduction of trade restrictions on both the import and export sides. Figure 7 shows how different sectors contribute to the overall trade and how production increases with full liberalisation. The expansion of economic activity is supported by increased investment, which rises by 0.6% to more than 2.1%, depending on whether only tariffs on intermediate goods imports are abolished or all other barriers curbing trade are dismantled, and lower import tariffs reduce the unitary cost of investment (investment price index).
C. Effects on employment and private consumption
Liberalising trade flows would raise employment by 1.47 million. All labour categories would benefit from increased employment in all policy simulations (Table 2) . Moreover, employment increases are relatively large for agricultural and other lowskilled workers and the two skilled labour categories. Full liberalisation increases employment in these categories by about 1.3%. As the economy expands, employment effects are positive but smaller in labour categories that are predominantly employed in service sectors, such as service shop workers and clerks. Trade liberalisation increases employment irrespective of whether the policies are reformed on either the import or export side or on both sides. Full trade liberalisation increases employment in most sectors, but there is some reallocation between sectors. Employment decreases in textiles and wearing apparel, electric equipment, machinery, and other manufacturing. The largest employment increase occurs in sectors that are not directly affected by trade policies, that is, not subjected to tariffs or export taxes, but sectors that benefit from higher overall production activity and are labour intensive. These sectors are trade business services and construction that together account for over 50% of the new created jobs.
Household income is higher in all simulations, the largest gains being reaped under the full liberalisation scenario ( 305 categories in the model as well as for capital, land, and natural resources. 9 Owners of land and natural resources experience the largest income gains of 4% and 10%, respectively, when all trade barriers are eliminated. Income of unskilled workers increases less than that of skilled workers (by 1% and 1.5%, respectively). Revenues on capital increase by less than labour income, 0.8%. However, the distributional effects from trade liberalisation are not clear: while owners of land clearly benefit from liberalisation, poorer households that are likely to be more affected by unemployment and are composed of low-skilled labour benefit from increasing employment. While income from high-skilled workers increases more, higher income households are also likely to receive a larger part of income from returns from capital where the effects are lower.
D. Adjustment costs
Trade liberalisation changes the structure of the economy, and this adjustment process takes time. In the short term, there are frictions in adjusting to the changed factor demand and consumption patterns. Figure 8 presents the effects of a trade liberalisation shock in the short term where labour and capital are immobile and government consumption and investment are predefined. In the short-run scenario, imports and exports respectively increase by 15% and 17% less than in the medium-long run full liberalisation scenario. Brazilian production can realise only one quarter of its increase, while households' income only increases by half that of the medium-long term. These differences are mainly driven by restricted resource reallocation in the short term and show the importance of flexible factor markets for the full realisation of trade liberalisation benefits. Despite increasing wages in the booming sectors following the impossibility of absorbing unemployed workers, the effects on household income are less positive in the short run compared with the medium and long runs, as workers from shrinking economic sectors are not able to relocate to other sectors. 
V. Sensitivity Analysis
A. Trade elasticities
This study departs from the METRO database -and GTAP -as it specifies higher elasticities of substitution between imports from different regions and between aggregate imports and domestic production. Indeed, GTAP elasticities are implausibly low and have been rejected by Liu et al. (2002) in a back-casting exercise using a simplified version of the GTAP model.
Moreover, GTAP elasticity estimates have been computed using 1994 trade data (Hertel et al. 2004 , Hummels 1999 , since that time, the trade landscape has been marked by ongoing important advances in transportation and communication technologies, which led to the so-called "second unbundling," a further slicing of production processes 13.19-14.64 14.65-16.09 16.10-17.54 17.55-18.99 19.00-20.44 20.45-21.89 21.90-23.34 23.35-24.79 24.80-26.24 26.25-27.69 27.70-29.14 29.15-30.59 30.60-32.04 32.05-33.49 33.50-34.94 34.95-36.39 36.40-37.84 37.85-39.29 39.30-40.74 40.75-42.19 12. Harrison et al. (2004) study the effects on the Brazilian economy of different policy options under the Mercosur trade negotiations using significantly higher elasticities. Their choice of elasticities finds some support in the estimates of Riedel (1988) and Athukorala and Riedel (1994) and produces results for terms of trade changes that are closer to the results of Chang and Winters (2002) . 10 At the same time, Harrison et al. (2004) focus on a long adjustment period of about 10 years, while in this study, the time horizon for the adjustment to policy shocks is assumed to be about three to five years. For this reason, this study adopts an intermediate choice and doubles the elasticities of substitution between imports from different regions and those between aggregate imports and domestic production. With respect to the original GTAP values, these elasticities are about two times higher, but they are still about three times lower than those used by Harrison et al. (2004) ; thus, they remain a conservative choice for the ease of substitutability between foreign suppliers and between foreign suppliers and domestic production, even in a fairly closed economy such as Brazil. The cautious estimates in this study are justified due to the considerable uncertainty around the values of trade Given the uncertainty regarding the choice of trade elasticities, the robustness of the model results is tested with a thorough sensitivity analysis.
11 For this purpose, the full liberalisation scenario is run 500 times with randomly drawn trade elasticities in the interval between 0.5 and 14.
12 The elasticities are sector specific and two rules are applied: each region faces the same trade elasticities on the import and export sides, and the relationship between the nesting levels is maintained.
13 Figure 9 plots the range and number of instances for the selected macroeconomic variables for Brazil, that is, GDP, imports, and exports, for the full liberalisation scenario. The results show a stable outcome wherein results are concentrated around the mean (0.88% in GDP, 23.5% in imports, and 21.5% in exports): The minimum and maximum effects in GDP deviate about 50% from the mean, and two-thirds of the results deviate less than 5% from the mean.
With the elasticities employed in this study (double standard GTAP), imports increase by 19.98% and exports increase by 18.75% in the full liberalisation scenario (Table 1) . These outcomes can be found in the fourth decile of the possible outcomes and are thus below the mean. This indicates that the study's outcomes cannot be considered extreme, despite the deviation from GTAP elasticities.
B. Flexible wages
The analysis so far assumed unemployment in all labour categories in Brazil, taking the unemployment figures from Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). Alternatively, when factors are assumed as fully employed, wages are flexible to reflect factor demand. Trade and all other effects are slightly smaller with full employment compared with the standard setting with unemployment (Table 3) . With full employment, expanding sectors now need to source workers from other sectors, and wages increase in the booming sectors to attract workers. Accordingly, the price decrease from lower input prices is dampened through increasing wages (wages increase by 0.4-0.6%). 11 We are grateful to Hannah Schürenberg-Frosch (2015) who shared the methodology and code for this exercise. 12 This interval includes the typical range of Armington elasticities (0.1~3) up to an interval proposed in several CGE studies (9~18; Schürenberg-Frosch 2015). The borders are narrowed due to computational issues. 13 We follow the generally applied setup for nested CES functions wherein elasticities are doubled on lower levels. This is done in order to maintain normal behaviour in the relationships. 
C. Capital markets
The standard closure follows the so-called Keynesian approach with investmentdriven savings. Investment is defined as fixed share of domestic final demand; government savings do not change, and households adjust the amount they save to investment demand. Alternatively, this assumption can be changed into a more neoclassical view, where the economy is savings driven. Results show that the specification of this assumption does not influence the model results (Table 3 ).
D. Government account
Government income is assumed as flexible in the standard closure, with the income tax balancing the income and expenditure differences and thus directly bouncing all possible budgetary effects directly on households. This closure choice has the advantage of not directly introducing sectoral biases in the model outcome. However, the closure choice might overestimate the burden on households.
When government income is predefined with inflexible tax rates, welfare effects are larger than income effects and significantly larger than in the standard closure. With fixed income, government expenditure needs to adjust to maintain the internal balance. As trade liberalisation reduces government income from import tariffs and indirect taxes, overall government income decreases and so does government expenditure, by -3.2%. This, in turn, has a strong effect on government activity, which is concentrated nearly exclusively in government services, a highly labour-intensive sector that does not directly profit from trade liberalisation. The consumption increase of households is not strong enough to overcome the negative effect, and effects are smaller compared with the standard closure. It is worth noting that trade effects are not affected by this closure swap, and the differences are related purely to internal reallocation and efficiency.
E. Exchange rate and current account
The model employs an exchange rate that allows for adjustments to relative income levels between regions. Together with the balance of the current account, this exchange rate defines the foreign exchange market. When the current account balance is fixed, as in the standard closure, the exchange rate adjusts to the relative income levels between regions. In the real world, or in a dynamic model, changes in the current account imply transfers between periods. In a static model, this mechanism is not available, and when the current balance is flexible, this would mean either getting or giving something away for free to the rest of the world. Table 3 shows this effect: a strong increase in imports is matched with a relatively small increase in exports. The size of this export effect can be interpreted as the pure cost reduction effect. To finance the current account balance deficit, which increases by 53%, foreign investment flows into Brazil increase investment in Brazil by 9.8%. As a result, domestic production increases, households are better off, and GDP increases stronger than before. Again, it is important to notice that this effect is not governed through some type of interest rate and that there is no mechanism of inter-temporal transfers in the static model. This scenario is thus likely to overestimate the benefits from trade liberalisation. The standard closure surely depicts a more conservative scenario, and even this conservative simulation shows the overall beneficial effects. 
VI. Conclusion
Compared to other countries, the Brazilian economy remains relatively closed. Moreover, as documented in this paper, trade protectionism has increased recently as policymakers attempted to reinforce the contribution of manufacturing in production, promote technological upgrades, and boost export competitiveness in manufacturing goods. However, manufacturing productivity in Brazil is low and stagnant compared with other emerging economies. Moreover, in spite of trade protection, the industry share in total value-added is small relative to other emerging economies and has even declined in recent years.
In view of the high trade barriers and recent increase in protection in Brazil, this study aims to quantify the impact of an unilateral policy of trade liberalisation that would act on three important policy channels: tariffs on imports, LCRs, and indirect taxes levied on exports. The model results convey a powerful message: trade protection, rather than support for industrial development and export competitiveness, is actually detrimental to achieving those objectives. The benefits stemming from lower barriers to trade on the efficiency of the economy are clear: LCRs and import tariffs limit the sourcing options of Brazilian producers, making intermediate inputs and capital goods more expensive, thus hampering cost competiveness.
Lowering barriers to trade allows firms to use a higher share of foreign intermediate goods in production. The major winners are manufacturing sectors, which manage to increase production by 2.6% in case of full liberalisation. In addition, production in the primary and tertiary sectors would increase as well. Manufacturing sectors benefit especially from liberalisation on the export side, that is, by eliminating indirect taxes levied on exports. There would be positive employment effects across all labour categories, and in absolute terms, especially in low-skilled occupations. A large part of these positive employment effects stems from increased overall demand and occur in sectors that are not directly affected by trade policies, such as service sectors.
Final goods are, in turn, sold at lower prices, enhancing the competitiveness of Brazilian exports and also benefitting Brazilian households. Lower barriers to trade would also reduce the unitary cost of capital, spurring investment and supporting further expansion of production going forward.
Although the economic effects on the overall economy are positive, it is important to identify the winners and losers at the sectoral level in order to devise policies that 313 facilitate resource mobility, in particular labour. Since the gains from lifting impediments to trade can only be reaped if the economy is flexible enough to smoothen the structural adjustment that follows trade liberalisation, specific training programmes should be put in place for workers in industries whose outputs would shrink after trade liberalisation. For instance, the model estimates that the textile industry would lose about 10% of its output in the case of implementation of the full liberalisation scenario. As this industry is highly concentrated, the potential to create depressed and underdeveloped areas is nonnegligible. Training programmes could include transferability of skills to other sectors, and skill upgrades could also be complemented by income support programmes or programmes to facilitate regional mobility. On the other hand, one sector registering the largest gains is transportation, which also has the potential to absorb workers.
From a trade policy standpoint, the analysis in this study only considers unilateral reduction of trade barriers. In reality, however, Brazil could use its own trade liberalisation to negotiate improvements in market access for its exporters, which could further strengthen the effects of lower trade barriers on exports and production. Taking these points together, the overall expected benefits from a comprehensive trade liberalisation agenda are likely to significantly exceed those estimated by the model. This observation applies more generally to Latin American countries, which have lower participation in GVCs and weak intra-regional linkages (e.g., Blyde 2014 , OECD 2015c . GVC participation is limited to the supply of inputs based on relatively unprocessed natural resources, and trade is concentrated around a small number of products and markets, leaving many Latin American countries particularly vulnerable to external shocks. In addition, in a world where competitiveness is linked to competitively priced intermediate inputs, missing integration allegedly held back development of innovation and employment-intensive activities. 
